One of the most important developments in international finance and resource economics in the past twenty years is the rapid and widespread emergence of the $6 trillion sovereign wealth fund industry. Oil exporters typically ignore below-ground assets when allocating these funds, and ignore above-ground assets when extracting oil. We present a unified stylized framework for considering both. Subsoil oil should alter a fund's portfolio through additional leverage and hedging. First-best spending should be a share of total wealth, and any unhedgeable volatility must be managed by precautionary savings. If oil prices are pro-cyclical, oil should be extracted faster than the Hotelling rule to generate a risk premium on oil wealth. Finally, we discuss how our analysis could improve the management of Norway's fund in practice.
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Introduction
Since 1994 the number of sovereign wealth funds has nearly quadrupled to 73 (SWF institute, 2013) . These funds hold some of the largest portfolios in the world and globally account for over $6 trillion in assets (ibid.). Two thirds of the sovereign wealth fund industry (by size) has been funded by selling below-ground assets such as oil, natural gas, copper and diamonds ("oil" for short). These funds often comprise a large part of commodity exporters' wealth. Azerbaijan's US$ 34 billion fund accounts for almost half its GDP, Qatar's US$ 170 billion fund accounts for almost two thirds of GDP, Saudi Arabia's US$ 740 billion funds are approximately four-fifths of GDP, Norway's US$ 840 billion fund is nearly one and a half times GDP, and the United Arab Emirates' US$ 1 trillion funds are over two and a half times its GDP (SWF Institute, 2013; IMF, 2013) .
The purpose of these funds is to smooth consumption of oil income: across generations because oil reserves are finite, and between periods because oil and asset prices are volatile. While such funds are professionally managed and often allocate their assets using modern portfolio theory, we argue that their investment strategies do not take due account of oil price volatility and subsoil reserves. Similarly, existing theories of optimal oil extraction do not take into account volatile financial markets. These are important issues for resource exporters, since commodity prices are notoriously volatile and below-ground assets can be worth much more than the above-ground fund.
Our aim is therefore to answer four questions about how below-ground resources should influence above-ground portfolios, and vice-versa. Firstly, how should one allocate above-ground assets given a volatile stock of below-ground assets? Secondly, how quickly should financial and oil wealth be consumed? Thirdly, how does this change if financial markets are incomplete, so that oil shocks cannot be completely hedged in the portfolio? Finally, how should the optimal extraction rate of below-ground assets be affected by risky above-ground assets?
We will show that policy-makers should adjust their above-ground portfolios to accommodate the volatility and erosion of below-ground oil stocks (hedging and 2 leverage effects respectively); consume a fixed share of total wealth; manage shocks that cannot be hedged with precautionary savings; and, if the marginal rent from extracting an additional barrel of oil, namely the oil price minus marginal extraction costs, covaries positively with average equity market returns, then oil should be extracted faster.
Our analysis combines three large and previously unrelated strands of literature. Firstly, the allocation of financial assets is described by CAPM equations modified for subsoil oil wealth. This extends the continuous-time analysis of optimal consumption-saving and portfolio choice (Merton, 1990) .
1 Secondly, consumption is described by a stochastic Euler equation, 2 extending the literature on prudence and precautionary savings to the case when both financial assets and oil extraction can be chosen. 3 Thirdly, the optimal rate of oil extraction is described by a stochastic Hotelling rule modified if the proceeds of extraction of below-ground wealth are invested in a risky above-ground financial portfolio. 4 Our intended contribution is to introduce a stylized framework that combines canonical insights from all three of these fields. These insights would be modified by including transaction costs and illiquidity premiums, which would help to explain why in practice fund managers do not adjust their portfolios too frequently by introducing some mean reversion into the portfolio decisions (Constantinides, 1986; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2013; Jong and Driessen, 2015) .
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 introduces our model for portfolio choice, saving and oil revenues. Section 3 shows how to allow for below-ground oil wealth with a predetermined path for oil production when the oil price is completely spanned by returns in asset markets. Section 4 deals with the case of investment restrictions which prevent the oil price being fully spanned. Section 5 derives the optimal path for oil extraction. Section 6 discusses the implications of our results and compares these with the policies adopted by the Norwegian fund. Finally, section 7 concludes and qualifies our results.
The model
Adopting Geometric Brownian motion processes for the oil price and asset returns, the problem is to choose the rate of public consumption C and portfolio asset weights wi, i = 1,.., n, to maximize the expected present value of utility with discount rate  > 0: 
where the value function ) ( , , O J F P t depends on the size of the fund F, the oil price O P and time t. 5 The rate of oil extracted at time t, ( ), Ot either declines exponentially at the rate κ with zero extraction costs (sections 3 and 4) 6 or is chosen optimally with convex costs (section 5). The fund has m risky assets, i = 1,.., m, with drift i and volatility i and one safe asset, i = m+1, with return r and volatility m+1 =0. There are thus n  m +1 assets. The fund holds Ni shares of assets, i = 1,.., n, each with price Pi, so
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.
This abstracts from all other public assets (e.g., future tax revenues) and liabilities (e.g., pensions). 6 The results can readily be extended for the case of a constant windfall of finite duration.
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The share of each asset in the fund is /,
The stochastic processes for the risky assets are: , 1,.., ,
where dZi is a Wiener process with cov(dZi dZj) = [ij] for i = 1,.., m. The returns of risky
We abstract from mean reversion and stochastic volatility in asset prices, and ignore transaction costs (discussed in section 6).
We thus assume that the coefficients in (3) Preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion,
where  is the coefficient of intertemporal substitution, 1/ the coefficient of relative risk aversion or the degree of intergenerational inequality aversion, and 1 + 1/ the coefficient of relative prudence. These are a member of the class of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences and thus permit an analytical solution to the asset allocation problem (Merton, 1971) . Section 3 also explores EpsteinZin preferences, which allows one to disentangle risk aversion and intertemporal substitution (Epstein and Zin, 1989; Duffie and Epstein, 1992) .
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The country is a small oil exporter that does not affect the oil price. The world oil price also follows a Geometric Brownian Motion process:
7 These have been used in empirical studies (e.g., Attanasio and Weber, 1989; Wang et al., 2013 oil-specific shock that is uncorrelated with the asset market shocks, du (see appendix A.1 and section 4).
Complete markets and a given path of oil extraction
With complete markets, oil wealth can be treated as tradable by replicating its properties with a synthetic bundle of traded financial assets. Accordingly, an arbitrage argument 6 can be employed to derive the value of the stream of oil revenues (see appendix A.1. for a derivation): 
where ( ) / ( ), 1,..,
The replicating bundle linearly combines exposures i  to many financial assets, which depend on the correlation of each risky asset with the oil price and its uniqueness amongst other financial assets. This bundle matches the variance of oil revenues and the amount of the safe asset is chosen to match the drift. Oil wealth is current oil revenues divided by the effective discount rate ψ, where ψ is the safe return r plus the rate of decline of oil production  minus the drift in the oil price O  plus the adjustment to compensate risk-averse investors for bearing oil price risk. 11 Oil wealth reacts to the current oil price only, as (5) implies oil price shocks are permanent under our assumptions.
Asset allocation: leverage and hedging demands
If claims to oil can be securitized, the proceeds can be invested in a diversified portfolio and the problem reduces to that in Merton (1990) . In practice, doing so may be difficult due to political and practical constraints 12 . Nevertheless, with the replicating bundle the problem reduces to choosing the net weight of each risky asset, i w for i = 1,.., m, in total 11 The value of an uncertain stream of income follows from discounting at the risk-free rate if the probability space is adjusted to a risk-neutral measure using a theorem due to Girsanov (1960) . 12 Politicians do not like the prospect of having sold oil for an ex-post low price, and risk-averse firms are unwilling to take on all price and production risk 7 above-and below-ground wealth, W = F + V. Evidently, the net weight of each risky asset in total wealth is constant:
and the net weight of all risky assets in total wealth is: 
Sovereign wealth funds should thus be structured so that net exposure to each asset in total wealth is constant. The optimal portfolio of risky assets (8) is independent of preferences and the level of wealth, but depends as usual on the drift and covariance of asset returns. The optimal part of total wealth allocated to risky assets (9) is proportional to the overall risk-adjusted return of the portfolio v and the willingness to take risk θ (the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion).
13
To ensure that net exposure to each financial asset is a constant share of total wealth (8) , one requires offsetting leverage and hedging demands for each risky asset as a share of the above-ground fund (10). The allocation of the fund approaches its non-oil level, i w , 13 If there is only one risky asset, (9) reduces to the Sharpe ratio, 2 11 ( ) / , r w    so the portfolio is proportional to the excess return of the risky asset over the safe asset, and the willingness to take risk, and inversely proportional to the variance of the return on the risky asset. With multiple risky assets the overall risk-adjusted return is lower if assets are positively correlated, so there is less scope for fluctuations to offset each other and to hedge oil.
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as oil is depleted.
14 Leverage demand involves holding more of each risky asset in the (Gintschel and Scherer, 2008; Scherer, 2009) . 16 The slope coefficient of a regression of demeaned asset returns versus demeaned oil returns.
with a mix of the "market index", i w , and an "oil hedging index", βi, constructed to replicate movements in the oil price. Over time the mix shifts from the second to the first index as oil is extracted from the ground (see (10)). Net demand may be negative for both risky assets (short positions) and riskless assets (leverage), which may not be practical for many SWFs. Section 4 addresses this by considering investment restrictions.
Consumption rules and precautionary saving
Oil wealth also affects precautionary saving and optimal consumption from the fund, as illustrated by the Euler equation governing the expected growth of consumption:
With complete markets, a closed-form solution for optimal consumption exists (Merton, 1990 ):
where the drift and the volatility of total wealth are W  and W  and total wealth also follows a Geometric Brownian Motion process:
The aggregate volatility of total wealth when portfolio weights are optimised is a weighted average of the volatility of each asset,
, and (13) Aggregate risk is managed by depressing consumption today to build a precautionary buffer of assets, as seen from the upward tilt of the expected consumption path in the final term of (11). The degree of tilt increases with the coefficient of relative prudence (1 + 1/), the riskiness of the portfolio 2 W  , and the size of the risky portfolio in total wealth, .
w The buffer compensates future periods for bearing additional risk, but does not temporarily support consumption when asset prices are low, as here asset price shocks are random walks and thus persistent.
The optimal spending path can be achieved with a rule that consumes a fixed proportion of below and above-ground wealth, (12). The proportion is affected by a higher return on the safe asset through the intertemporal substitution effect (negative as future consumption has become cheaper) and the income effect (positive as lifetime wealth has gone up). The former dominates the latter if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, , exceeds one. From (12) builds up a buffer of assets against future risk (Kimball, 1990) with absolute risk aversion, /C, falling as consumption rises.
With uncertain oil and asset prices and r = , we observe from (13) how total aboveand below-ground wealth evolves over time. 19 It rises due to the premium earned on risky assets, W r   . It falls (rises) if the intertemporal substitution effect is dominated by the income effect in consumption 20 with the extent depending on the risk/return tradeoff of total wealth,
Intergenerational equity and risk aversion: Epstein-Zin preferences
To capture intergenerational concerns relevant for the long investment horizons of sovereign wealth funds, it is important to separate the coefficient of relative risk aversion, CRRA, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, EIS or the coefficient of relative intergenerational inequality aversion, IIA = 1/EIS (Epstein and Zin, 1989) .
Restricting attention to one risky and one safe financial asset, we can show that the share of risky assets in total wealth and consumption are 
where the coefficient of relative prudence equals CRP = 1 + 1/EIS = 1 + IIA for these preferences.
Investment restrictions and a given path of oil extraction
19 Without oil or asset price uncertainty and r = , any drop in below-ground wealth must be exactly compensated for by an increase in above-ground wealth to fully smooth consumption (Hartwick, 1977) . 20 That is, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution  is less (greater) than unity
Additional precautionary saving
Many funds restrict investment in certain asset classes for social and political reasons.
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This is a form of incomplete markets which prevents the oil price being replicated by a bundle of traded financial securities. To illustrate this, assume that the fund cannot invest in a particular asset, so 0 Oh   in (5) and the oil price is not fully spanned. In that case, there must be additional precautionary saving to cope with residual volatility. 22 With investment restrictions, the Euler equation can be approximated by (see appendix A.3):
where w is given in (9) and W  in (11). Total wealth evolves according to:
Hence, investment restrictions have both a precautionary and a wealth effect on consumption. The former arises as unspanned risk cannot be hedged optimally, whereas the latter because investment in a specific asset yielding high or low returns is not possible, as such an asset simply does not exist or investment in it is prohibited. Asset weights adjust to find the closest replicating bundle leaving only uncorrelated residual risk (see also appendix A.1.). The precautionary effect describes the additional savings needed because some oil price risk remains unhedged as in (14). The first term on the right-hand side is the usual slope of optimal consumption. The second term captures precautionary saving and is proportional to the coefficient of relative prudence, CRP =
(1 + 1/). The wealth effect describes the change in the expected return on total wealth from not investing in a particular asset (see (15)). If an asset cannot be held by the fund (cf. asset h in (15)), there is still some exposure to it embodied in the oil price. With complete markets this exposure is offset inside the fund, so the net exposure is a constant share of total wealth. With incomplete markets this net exposure cannot be fully offset and will earn a rate of return, changing the expected return on total wealth. Its importance will diminish as oil reserves are depleted.
Stylized illustration of oil-CAPM model
We now illustrate how a sovereign wealth fund is affected by the presence of subsoil oil, depending on whether or not it has access to hedging assets. We suppose that there is a risk-free asset, r, and two risky assets: 1 uncorrelated with the oil price (the market asset) and 2 perfectly negatively correlated with the oil price (the hedging asset). 23 To ensure the latter asset is used for hedging only, we assume it has a zero excess return.
This focuses our attention on the precautionary effect (and sets the wealth effect to zero). To buy enough of risky asset 2 to fully hedge the oil price, the fund needs to borrow (14). Panel (b) shows optimal consumption as a share of total wealth. If oil price risk cannot be hedged due to incomplete markets or investment prohibitions, the share of consumption in total wealth is no longer constant.
Portfolio allocation and spending with endogenous oil extraction
The optimal speed of extracting oil may be understood using the Hotelling rule. This states that the expected capital gains from keeping an additional barrel of oil in the ground must equal the return from extracting, selling and earning interest on it (Hotelling, 1931) . We now extend this rule for volatile oil and financial asset prices. 
Optimal rates of oil extraction
Since the data suggest that the oil price is positively correlated with financial assets, we proceed under this assumption. 24 Without loss of generality we assume that the oil price can be perfectly hedged with a single financial asset k, Ok dZ dZ  . The policy maker chooses the consumption rate C, the rate of oil extraction O, and asset weights wi, i =1, .., m to maximize expected welfare,
subject to the budget constraint:
the Geometric Brownian Motion processes for asset prices (3) and oil prices (4), and the reserve depletion equation
where oil rents are revenues minus extraction costs, ( , ) ( ),
and total extraction costs are increasing in the extraction rate ( '( ) 0 GO ) and convex to ensure a solution ( ''( ) 0 GO ) (cf., Pindyck, 1984) exists. Practically, the assumption of convexity corresponds to costs of extraction for a decision maker at a national level increasing more than proportionally when the rate of extraction is increased. 25 From the depletion equation (18), cumulative oil extraction cannot exceed initial reserves, 24 Empirically the extent of this correlation varies over time, as is expected when the source of the oil price shock matters (Kilian, 2009 ). We abstract from this complication here. 25 In practice, oil fields evolve stochastically as new fields are discovered and existing fields become economical (e.g., Pindyck, 1978) . Extraction costs might be better captured by high upfront investment and small marginal costs. Reserves are also endogenous to exploration effort, but we abstract from these complications here.
It can be shown (see appendix A.5) that the optimal path for the expected rate of oil extraction satisfies the modified Hotelling rule:
In the particular case of quadratic extraction costs, 
The stochastic Hotelling rule (19) states that the expected change in marginal oil rents must equal the return on safe assets plus a risk premium. Since we assume that oil and E dJ d), all oil price risk can be diversified and no risk premium is needed. The more correlated oil and asset markets are, the less oil price shocks can be diversified and the higher the risk premium. Figure   5 shows that oil price volatility implies that it is optimal to extract oil initially more quickly. As the rate of extraction drops, extraction costs fall non-linearly boosting the marginal return on oil extraction.
Equation (20) indicates that the optimal rate of oil extraction is positively correlated with the oil price, so that a sudden jump in the oil price requires a jump in the extraction rate to make the most of it. Oil price shocks affect the rate of extraction most when reserves (and in turn O) are highest, since this is when the majority of oil remains exposed to volatile prices. As the date of exhaustion approaches, the rate of oil extraction gets closer to what it would be without volatile oil and asset prices. Note that the size of the fund does not matter for the optimal rate of oil extraction, only the properties of the assets in the background. Our finding that stochastic oil prices increase the oil extraction rate is consistent with earlier studies, but uses a different mechanism. Earlier work ignored financial assets and relied on "extractive prudence" driven by sufficiently convex marginal extraction costs, Pindyck, 1981) . 26 This means it is better to extract oil quickly because, once it is above ground and sold, it is no longer exposed to risk. By restricting our attention to quadratic extraction costs ( '''( ) 0 GO  ), we deliberately rule out this type of prudence. In our framework oil rents are still exposed to risk above the ground as they must be invested. Hence, oil should be treated as just another part of the total portfolio.
The effect of risk on extraction is driven by "extractive risk aversion" ( ''( ) GO ) rather than by extractive prudence ( '''( ) GO ) and so poses less onerous restrictions on extraction costs. Recent literature separates extraction and drilling decisions (e.g. Anderson et al., 2014) . These models also display concavity in either or both choice 26 Aggressive oil extraction also occurs with convex marginal utility arising from market power (van der Ploeg, 2010). 
Sovereign wealth funds with endogenous rates of oil extraction
With complete markets and without investment restrictions oil rents can be fully hedged by the fund, regardless of the path of oil extraction. This involves continuously adjusting the asset allocation so that the net exposure to risk remains a constant share of total above-and below-ground wealth. With complete markets oil wealth can be replicated with a bundle comprising the perfectly correlated asset k and the safe asset n, and the value of this bundle evolves according to (see appendix A.6 for a proof):
dt rV t r O t V t dt O t V t dZ t
where ( 
where 27 Other work estimates oil price volatility from options data and finds that it delays investment in Texas oil wells (Kellogg, 2014) . However, this relies on a real options argument, whereas we focus on risk aversion and hedging.
w F t W t i k w w t F t W t O t V t W t
    (23)O O O d P S t dt P S t dZ      (24)
21
The drift and volatility of oil rents are replicated by continuously reallocating the bundle of the perfectly correlated risky asset and the safe asset as PO and S change. Holdings of asset k in the bundle are adjusted so that the change in oil rents,
, is matched by that in the bundle, ( , ) ( )

. The share of the safe asset is chosen so that the instantaneous drifts also match. As before, the fund is managed to ensure that net exposure to each financial asset is a constant share of total wealth:
, 1,..,
. Any exposure to asset k embodied in oil, ( , ) k Ot  , is offset by the asset's weight in the fund, () k w t , so that the net weight in total wealth is constant. By rearranging (23) holdings of each asset in the fund can, as before, be split up into a leveraged and a hedging component for the perfectly correlated asset k:
As the asset allocation and consumption problems can be expressed in terms of total wealth (22), propositions 2 and 3 apply. Judicious management of the fund allows consumption to be smoothed in line with the permanent income hypothesis and to buffer consumption from oil price volatility by hedging it with traded financial assets.
Policy implications: Norway's Government Pension Fund Global
The policies of Norway's Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) 28 closely follow standard CAPM recommendations ignoring oil wealth. Firstly, the GPFG uses the FTSE Global All Cap Index as the equity benchmark (with around 7,400 individual stocks, a 28 At US$840 billion the GPFG is the largest single fund in existence, which was established in 1990 to smooth expenditure financed from oil after a period of fiscal volatility in the 1970s and 1980s. Evaluating governance, accountability and transparency, structure and behavior, the GPFG ranked first on the first two criteria and second overall, behind Alaska's US$45 billion permanent fund (Truman, 2008) , and received the highest rating on the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (SWF Institute, 2013) . It has been called a "model" for sovereign wealth funds (Chambers, et al., 2012; Larsen, 2005) .
close approximation of the market). 29 This is consistent with holding the optimal risky
Secondly, the Ministry of Finance chooses the equity/bond mix, and in 2007 moved from 40/60% to 60/40%, as it was willing to accept more risk for a higher return. This is consistent with choosing the size of the risky portfolio based on preferences and the overall risk and return of the market, as in (9) with W = F. Thirdly, a fixed share of the fund (4% according to Norway's handlingsregelen) is consumed each year, as in (12) with W=F.
GPFG's management mandate does not mention oil wealth at all (NBIM, 2013), thus leaving Norway exposed to its large and volatile stock of oil wealth: the "elephant in the ground". 30 Norway, and other oil-rich countries with similar funds, would benefit by letting the asset allocation and the consumption rule in the GPFG vary over time.
Norway's asset allocation should vary over time to hedge as much of the volatility of remaining subsoil oil as possible. 31 In the first-best case described in section 3 this would involve taking large long positions in some industries, and large short positions in others (that may exceed the size of the fund), and reversing these positions as oil is extracted.
Such highly leveraged positions expose the country to substantial risk if there are systematic shocks (Das and Uppal, 2004) . They may also become illiquid, which invalidates the assumption of exogenous prices. Furthermore, the short positions assume that the covariance matrix is stable over time. In practice correlations between oil and each sector vary depending on the type of shock hitting the world economy (Kilian, 2009 ). As these correlations can only be estimated using past data and the size of the hedging positions are so large, there is the potential for large basis risk between oil and 29 The benchmark is 60% equities, tracking the FTSE Global All Cap Index; up to 5% real estate, tracking the Investment Property Databank's Global Property Benchmark; and up to 40% bonds, of which 70% government and 30% corporate bonds, both tracking Barclays indices. 30 Norway has proven reserves of nearly 9 billion barrels of oil and 73 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (BP, 2014) . At 2013 prices these are worth US$ 945 billion and US$ 777 billion, respectively. 31 Empirical simulations using the correlation of oil prices with financial assets indicate that Norway's exposure to aggregate oil price volatility is halved if oil wealth is hedged in the sovereign wealth fund (Gintschel and Scherer, 2008) and that the fund invests less aggressively in risky assets as it ages (Scherer, 2009; Balding and Yao, 2011) . These studies focus on asset allocation but abstract from optimal consumption-saving decisions or oil extraction.
the hedging portfolio. Finally, as oil is extracted the highly leveraged positions must be reversed which will incur substantial transaction costs for a large fund. 32 Therefore the target index should not be rebalanced too frequently and portfolios should only be adjusted gradually.
A more pragmatic, second-best approach to asset allocation might be to only vary the equity/bonds mix. 33 This would be transparent and easy to explain to investors and the public. It would also notrequire short positions, have lower transaction costs, and would not rely on a large, time-varying correlation matrix covering all market assets. In this approach, the only risky asset is the overall equity market (e.g., the FTSE Global All Cap Index). If oil is sufficiently positively correlated with this market, the hedging demand to offset oil risk will exceed the leverage demand. 34 In this case, the GPFG should hedge the exposure of subsoil reserves to oil price risk by holding fewer equities and more safe assets while there is oil in the ground. Over time the oil reserves will be depleted and the exposure to equities embodied in subsoil oil will fall. This allows the above ground fund's equity exposure to rise, so that equities make up a greater share of the portfolio as oil is extracted.
The consumption rule should be a constant share of total assets, and thus should fall as a share of the fund as oil is extracted. If oil price risk is perfectly hedged as described in section 3, this rule should hold exactly. If hedging is imperfect, as would happen by only varying the equity/bond mix, slightly more precautionary savings would be needed.
More precautionary saving is also needed if the fund faces a short-sales constraint.
Recently, the fund has stopped investing in coal and oil stocks. If the aim is to hedge subsoil oil, it should go further by taking short positions in oil, gas and other stocks that 32 See a recent report to the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) (Ministry of Finance, 2014a). 33 Gintschel and Scherer (2008) impose short-sale constraints. This does not address the transactions costs that funds face by continuously rebalancing or potentially unstable correlations between assets. 34 The correlation between the oil price and the overall equity market will also vary over time, though it will be more stable than a covariance matrix covering all 7,400 assets in the FTSE Global All Cap Index. Varying correlations will alter how quickly the equity share in the fund rises. Future work could account for this using regime-switching (cf. Ang and Bekaert, 2002) .
are positively correlated with oil prices. If the aim is to protect the environment, spending should be curtailed to build up a buffer against less diversified risks. In general though, spending as a share of the fund should fall over time as above-ground assets account for an increasing share of total wealth.
These recommendations are relevant for the current debate in Norway. The fund excludes investments in certain assets for social and political reasons, such as tobacco and defense firms, and early 2015 also in assets affected by climate change and other environmental concerns such as coal, oil sands, cement and gold mining. In late 2014
Norway also established a government commission to assess its 4% spending rule due to concerns about excessive fiscal stimulus (Ministry of Finance 2014b). This follows declining spending as a share of GPFG assets, from nearly 6% in 2010 to below 3% in 2014, and there have been calls to limit spending to 3% in the future (Olsen, 2014) .
Concluding remarks
Commodity exporters have two major types of national assets: natural resources below the ground and a sovereign wealth fund above it. Although some attempts to hedge commodity price volatility have been made, from long-term forward agreements in iron ore until 2010 to the purchase of oil options by Mexico in 2008, there is no evidence of systematic coordination of below-and above-ground assets. We have made the case for coordinating the management of these two types of asset by integrating the theories of portfolio allocation, precautionary saving, and optimal oil extraction under oil and asset price volatility.
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, commodity exporters should change the allocation of their sovereign wealth fund by leveraging all risky assets and hedging subsoil oil risk. These effects are proportional to the ratio of oil and fund wealth, so unwind as resource reserves are depleted. Secondly, consumption should be a constant share of total oil and fund wealth. This stabilizes the mean and variance of spending as total wealth evolves steadily whilst oil reserves are replaced by financial assets, but 25 relies on the degree to which the oil price can be hedged by components of the aboveground portfolio. Thirdly, if oil wealth cannot be adequately hedged, less should be consumed initially in the interests of precautionary savings in the face of the additional unhedgeable risk that remains. Fourthly, the rate of oil extraction should be faster than predicted by the standard Hotelling rule if oil prices are volatile and positively correlated with financial markets. This generates a risk premium on subsoil oil, as convex extraction costs will fall faster than the rate of extraction. The size of the premium will depend on oil's correlation with the market, and disappears to zero if their returns are independent.
Our analysis attempts to offer a first step towards an integrated approach to managing sovereign wealth funds and natural resources under uncertainty. To do this we combine canonical models of asset allocation, precautionary savings and oil extraction. These models, while widely used and theoretically appealing, have received empirical criticism (Griffin, 1985; Jones, 1990; Fama and French, 2004; Anderson at al., 2014) . Future work can address this along three dimensions. The first is to analyze the effect of financial assets on natural resources in more detail, allowing for the exploration and discovery of new reserves 35 , and extraction decisions at the discrete well level (Kellogg, 2014; Anderson, et al., 2014; Venables, 2014) . The second is to extend the analysis to include other non-financial assets such as domestic non-traded capital, human capital and pension liabilities, absorption constraints, general equilibrium effects of spending resource revenues, 36 and the benefits from structural reform to make the economy less vulnerable to commodity price volatility. Finally, there is scope for modelling oil and asset prices in more detail. In practice prices exhibit mean reversion (Wachter, 2002) , stochastic volatility (Chacko and Viceira, 2005; Fouque et al., 2013) , large jumps (Ngwira and Gerrard, 2007) and time-varying correlations (Bollerslev et al., 1988; Longin and Solnik, 1995) . Although these extensions allow a better empirical testing of our results, we conjecture that the qualitative nature of our policy insights will be unaffected.
the investment set can still be observed and can be used to value oil wealth. The value thus derived is a market value. Taking equation (5) 
which can be readily verified using Ito's lemma and comparing coefficients with (4).
Lemma A1: With complete markets, the capitalized value of oil income is:
Derivation: Firstly, we construct a portfolio with value V (P1, .., Pm, t) which consists of assets 1, .., n that is identical to the capitalized value of oil and distributes an amount of cash equal to ( ) ( ) O t P Ot per unit time. This value evolves according to:
With the aid of Ito's lemma the dynamics of the portfolio can be written as:
where
Comparing coefficients with (A3) gives:
. This implies:
Secondly, we create another portfolio with value X(t) that consists of oil wealth V(t), the risky assets and the safe asset. This portfolio is dynamically constructed, so short positions offset long positions, there is no net risk, and the net value of the portfolio is 
where the second equality follows from (A3), the third equality from (A6) and 11 [ ,.
., ]'.
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Suppose that the weights in this new portfolio are dynamically constructed so that there is no risk:
'0 V w du du      and the last two terms in the last equality of (A7) vanish. The weights that would achieve this are ( / ) , 1,.., .
Arbitrage dictates that such a constructed portfolio must have a zero expected excess return over the risk-free rate:
Combining (A8) with (A5) gives the following optimality condition:
Thirdly, the proposed capitalized value of oil income and associated partials,
satisfy (A9) by substitution. Lemma A1 thus gives capitalized oil income.
Lemma A1 establishes (6). The instantaneous rate of change in the value of oil income is found by applying Ito's lemma to this equation to give:
The result in (7) follows from substituting (A11), (2), and (5) 
A.2. Asset allocation with exogenous oil extraction
Here we derive the optimal portfolio weights in a sovereign wealth fund in the presence of oil, with and without investment restrictions based on Merton (1990 ,
Note that m was a traded asset that was correlated with all other assets. Above-ground wealth is accumulated according to (2). We obtain:
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is: 
The first-order conditions with respect to C and w i are:
34 Equation (A17) gives the optimal weights in the fund:
If markets are complete,
from (12). If markets are incomplete, instead of solving the arising partial differential equations numerically, we approximate these partials from the complete markets case or, alternatively, assume that consumption is a linear function of total wealth. With and without investment restrictions we then obtain:
Defining
wW w F V  , rearranging (A19) gives (8) and (10).
A.3. Optimal consumption with exogenous oil extraction
If markets are complete we can find a closed-form solution for the value function ( , , ) Merton (1990) . Substituting the first-order conditions (A16) and (A17) into the HJB equation (A14) gives:
The closed-form solution to this stochastic partial differential equation is:
, .
(12) follows from substituting (A21) into (A16). Applying Ito's lemma to (A16):
Using Ito's lemma we obtain:
In addition the derivative of (A14) with respect to F is: 
Substituting (A17) and (A23) into (A24) gives:
We also have: (11) and (14) follow from substituting (A25) and (A28) into (A22). Equation (11) 
A.4. Complete markets and exogenous oil paths: Epstein-Zin preferences
The results in section 3.3 follow from solving the HJB equation in the undiscounted value function J(F) modified for Epstein-Zin preferences (Duffie and Epstein, 1992 
A.5. Endogenous oil extraction
The HJB equation for the problem in (16), (17), (3), (4) and (18) 
Upon substitution of (A33) into (A35), we obtain:
  
